China Rise Literature

Considering that the rise of China is the most read topic in the print and internet media for over a decade, it is surprising that there is not more literature on the subject.

There are books concerning business in China, finance and economics, politics and foreign affairs. However, few books specifically deal with the broad issue of China’s rise: where is it going and why.

The few authors there are fall into two categories. There are those who feel it is very evident that the rise will continue until China overtakes America and, moreover, becomes itself the global superpower. These are not necessarily of course the same things. There are others who are gloomy about China’s prospects and anticipate early demise. The overwhelming weight is in favour of the first opinion. This is also supported by leading investment banks such as Goldman Sachs. There is perhaps an understandable tendency among observers to take past data and extrapolate them into future trends. Unfortunately the future is rarely based on straight lines from the past.

We could view the following as primary examples of the literature:

Zbigniew Brzezinski
“Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power” (2012)

Martin Jacques                      
“When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World” (2009)

Ian Morris                          
“Why the West Rules – for Now” (2010)

Arvind Subramaniam             
“Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance” (2010)

As one might guess, these books take a rather optimistic view.

Gordon Chang                      
“The Coming Collapse of China” (2010)

This author of course is less optimistic.

Chang’s book is not only heavily outnumbered by those of the opposing view but was of course written sufficiently long ago that what was then “coming” might be assumed to have arrived within a decade. While all authors appear to address the same topic, they all differ in what they think is relevant to discuss in order to lead us to their preferred conclusion.

The four recent optimistic works are by Martin Jacques at the London School of Economics, Arvind Subramaniam of the Peterson Institute, Ian Morris at Stanford and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. They all cover valuable ground. Jacques and Morris are the most original and interesting in the ground they cover and the points they make.  Even though some books, namely those by Jacques and Morris, are quite long, it is surprising that no author gives significant weight to China’s major threat; that of demographic change. Jacques gives eight critical differentiations for China and suggests these will ensure its dominance. It is a “civilisation state” not a nation state.  It will probably ‘revive’ a tributary system with East Asia. China has a unique perspective on race. It has a continental-sized population and area which makes it unique. There is no intermediation between the state and the citizen, neither civil society nor conceptions of individual rights. Dramatic change has until recently been China’s hallmark. The Communist Party has demonstrated an admirable ability to continually transform itself. It is original that it will ascend from developing country to dominant country. This fact will forge its outlook. While not easy to summarise extended arguments, we should note that although many of these statements may well be true, that does not make them at the same time in any way predictive. Chinese history exaggerated the tributary system; China’s contemporary trade is a rather romanticised argument for suggesting a tributary revival. I have in my own way noted several of the observations Jacques makes. However, that they exist does not ensure the future he postulates. A powerful central state and weak citizens has not guaranteed France a successful future. Demography is sharply curtailing any population edge for China. The rise of India’s population, as well as that of America, coupled with its own eventual diminution, will blunt China’s singularity. Until now, the Party has adapted well but there is no guarantee that harder transformation in future will be accomplished with as much aplomb. As financial regulators often remind us, past performance is no guide to the future. We need only think of the cessation of reforms after 2000. Furthermore, idiosyncratic racial views may make enemies but are certainly no guarantee of Chinese success.

Subramaniam largely discusses finance and the economy as if existing in a vacuum, and having no close relationship with trends and conditions in broader society.   Brzezinski’s book on the “receding West”, “China’s rise” and its “strategic patience” in which he says the US has six “key vulnerabilities”: ignorance of history and geography, exacerbated by a one-sided emphasis on American history, “mounting debt”, “widening income inequality”, a “flawed financial system”, “gridlocked political system” and “decaying national infrastructure”. He strangely ignores China’s own ranking on these criteria. National history teaching is biased. Public debt is rising. It might still be less than US debt but there is historically no specific level at which default might occur. Defaults among developing countries tend to arise before reaching the debt levels of advanced economies. Widening income inequality in China has already reached American levels. Beijing’s financial framework is weak, whether we look at the banking system, capital markets, foreign exchange reserves or the budget. America’s ability to damage its financial system and recover still seems intact. China’s political system finds policy implementation difficult and is gridlocked in its own way. Beijing may lack a decaying infrastructure but its risky new infrastructure comes at the price of ballooning debt and potentially numerous accidents owing to hasty decisions, deficient preparation and a stressed environment. China’s extensive modern infrastructure is overshadowed by the implications of rapid ageing, a diminishing workforce and an eventual population decline. Distinguished Western-based pessimists can summarise visible domestic decline but often seem to know little about contemporary domestic China and are perhaps dazzled through having met senior leaders there, whose role is not necessarily to give an objective appraisal of domestic conditions.

My own view is that, as usual, the likely outcome is more nuanced than the strident titles in the books – on either side – suggest.